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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms’ inclination
to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordi-
nation of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms
intensify cooperation and produce in a joint plant, this profit is still higher due to
lower investment costs. Since firms return to competition after a defection from the
collusive agreement, a high competitive profit implies a weak punishment. Collusion
is thus more difficult, the closer firms cooperate in manufacturing. Moreover, given
competition or collusion in the market, joint production yields the highest profit and
welfare.
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The number of strategic alliances, among them production joint ventures and other
collaborative projects in manufacturing, rose markedly in recent years. The trade-off
between the potential efficiency gains from such cooperation and the possible losses
from increased market power is an important issue for competition policy.
In order to promote the competitiveness of domestic industries by allowing for ef-
ficiency gains from cooperation, the National Cooperative Research and Production
Act was enacted in the USA in 1993. In the European Union horizontal cooperation
between competitors is regulated by the articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome
and the new Block Exemptions and Horizontal Guidelines of 2001. This rather le-
nient regulation of cooperation in production, R&D, and marketing reflects that the
implied intensification of dynamic competition, e.g. by development of new products
or improvement of the production processes, is judged to be more important than
the potential costs of collusion.
The more lenient legal treatment of horizontal inter-firm cooperation was accompa-
nied by experts’ warnings that such law changes could alleviate tacit anticompetitive
behavior (collusion) of the participating firms (c.f., e.g. Jorde, Teece 1990, Shapiro,
Willig 1990). Despite such worries, there are no econometric studies and only a small
number of theoretical papers that analyze the effect of such cooperation and collusion
in the market. This literature focuses entirely on cooperation in R&D.1 There are
also a few studies of horizontal cooperation in manufacturing by Roy Chowdhury ,
Roy Chowdhury (2001), as well as Kwoka (1992), Bresnahan, Salop (1986), and
Reynolds , Snapp (1986). Chen, Ross (2003) study cooperation in the production
of an input. However, none of these authors considers the possibility of an implicit
agreement in the product market. These analyses do not take into account that
firms usually compete in a market over a long time and thus can credibly threaten
to punish a violator of an illegal (tacit or implicit) agreement by aggressive behavior
in the future. Papers that assess the additional effect of long-run competition con-
sider only cooperation in research, e.g. Martin (1995), Petit , Tolwinski (1999), and
Kesteloot , Veugelers (1995). Research, however, is characterized by the involuntary
leakage or conscious exchange of newly gained knowledge, whereas in manufacturing
1 Recent examples are among others, Anbarci et al. (2002), Battaggion, Garella (2001), Hinloopen
(2000), and Brod , Shivakumar (1997). Empirical papers as those by Hernán et al. (2003), Kaiser
(2002), and Bernstein, Nadiri (1989) investigate the factors determining the formation of research
joint ventures, but not their effect on competition in the product market.
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the improvement of the production process in one plant has no effect on the effi-
ciency of production in others. The motives for and the effects of cooperation are
hence different in R&D and manufacturing.
The most cited motive for cooperation in manufacturing is the potential gain in
efficiency (c.f., e.g. Johnson, Houston 2000). Another very important advantage is
the internalization of the “negative externality” that arises from investments in the
production process. A firm that invests in process improvement thereby reduces
its rivals’ profits since it lowers its own unit cost, produces more and competes
more aggressively in the market. Thus, such cost reducing investments are a prime
example of a strategy that makes a firm a “tough” competitor in the terminology
introduced by Fudenberg, Tirole (1984). As this is true for all competitors, the
possibility of process improvement results in a prisoners’ dilemma. Each firm cuts
own unit costs by high investments in order to keep up with its rivals. This more
aggressive competition reduces the profits additionally to the expenditures on pro-
cess improvement. If firms cooperate in manufacturing and coordinate investments,
they are able to mitigate this negative externality and gain higher profits. A larger
pool of financial funds and stronger bargaining power in negotiations with banks
and financial investors are additional advantages of cooperation. Many examples of
such alliances or joint ventures can be found in the automobile industry, where firms
increasingly often produce the chassis, gearboxes, machines and some times even
whole cars jointly in order to reduce production costs, but market the final products
independently. For example, Fiat and General Motors cooperate in the production
of engines and other parts and produce a light commercial van with Peugeot in
a jointly owned factory (c.f. The Economist, April 4th 2002 and June 2nd 2000).
The cooperation of several large producers of mobile phones in the production of
specialized software is another example (c.f. The Economist, Feb 11th 1999).
The model proposed here describes such cases and derives their effect on firms’ in-
clination to collude in the product market. As most firms regularly invest in order
to optimize the production process, cooperation in manufacturing implies coordina-
tion of such investment decisions. In order to account for the fact that collective
efforts take various organizational forms, we distinguish two types of cooperation,
namely loose coordination of investment decisions in a production joint venture and
close cooperation by joint production in a single plant. These are compared to non-
cooperative production termed investment competition. In contrast to the papers
by Kesteloot , Veugelers (1995) and Cabral (2000) on collective research, we account
for the fact that contracts on cooperation in manufacturing, R&D and other fields
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are allowed by antitrust regulation and therefore can be enforced in court. In fact,
the level of investments can be verified easily by checking invoices and wage bills.
Our analysis shows that cooperation in manufacturing hampers collusion, whereas
competition in the investment stage strengthens an anticompetitive agreement. Fur-
ther, with joint production an implicit collusive agreement is less attractive than with
coordination of investments in a production joint venture. The basic intuition for
this seemingly counterintuitive result is the following. With cooperation in produc-
tion, a firm accounts for the negative effect of a decrease in its own unit cost on the
competitors’ profits and invests less in the production process. Consequently, the
competitive profit is higher than in the case of investment competition. This in turn
implies a lower potential punishment which makes collusion more difficult. At the
same time, due to the internalization of the negative externality and the additional
cost savings achieved by production in a single plant, the individual competitive
profits are even higher in the case of joint production, so that collusion is least likely
in this case. Moreover, the resulting welfare level here is the highest within the three
possible types of organizing the manufacturing process.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we derive the prof-
its and the incentive to participate in an implicit quota agreement in four different
settings: the case without investments (the benchmark case), investment competi-
tion, production in a joint venture, and joint production in a single plant. In Section
3, we compare a firm’s incentive to collude in these four cases and show that coop-
eration destabilizes an implicit anticompetitive agreement. The private profitability
of cooperation is demonstrated in Section 4, whereas welfare effects are discussed in
Section 5. The Conclusion summarizes our results.
2 Collusion and Cooperative Production
In most oligopolistic markets firms compete over a long time span and have neither
a plan to exit the market at a certain point in time nor do they know when the
market will disappear due to lack of demand. Firms repeatedly compete with the
same rivals because oligopolies are as a rule protected by high entry barriers. We
model such a market by assuming that competition takes place over an infinite num-
ber of periods. Such an infinitely repeated game can also be interpreted as a model
of finitely repeated competition with uncertain end (c.f. Tirole, 1988, 253). In this
case, firms valuation of future profits accounts for the uncertainty of continuation of
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the competition. The assumption of an infinite time horizon is hence a convenient
simplification that is not as restrictive as it might seem at first glance. With such
long-term interaction, firms have an incentive to restrain competition by implicitly
agreeing to produce quantities below the competitive level. In order to maximize
their joint profits, firms will set the lowest quantity that just not destabilizes collu-
sion. Such an implicit quota agreement can be enforced because firms can credibly
threaten to punish a deviator by producing the competitive quantity for ever.2
In order to highlight the effect of investments in the production process on an implicit
agreement in the product market, we will first derive firms’ inclination to collude in
a situation without such expenditures.
2.1 No Investments in Production
Friedman (1971) analyzes the basic case of tacit collusion between symmetric firms
that do not invest in the production process. We briefly review a part of his results
that will serve as a benchmark for comparison with the three cases where firms invest
in the improvement of the production process. In this simple model of competition
over an infinite horizon, a firm takes part in an implicit agreement if the resulting
discounted stream of current and future collusive profits is at least as large as the
one-time gain from cheating and the profit stream in the ensuing infinite punishment
phase. Hence, the implicit agreement is advantageous if
1
1 − δ πA ≥ πD +
δ
1 − δ πN
holds, where δ is the market discount factor.3 Index A stands for a collusive “agree-
ment”, D for “defection”, and N for “Nash”-Cournot competition. By solving for the
critical threshold of the discount factor, fulfilling this condition with equality, we
obtain
δ ≥ δ ≡ πD − πA
πD − πN
(1)
as the condition for joint monopolization of the market. Obviously, collusion is pos-
sible as long as firms value future profits higher than indicated by the critical value
2 Shorter periods of more severe punishments could be used to implement an optimal punishment
as introduced by Abreu (1986). Here, we consider an unrelenting trigger strategy in order to keep
the analysis as simple as possible.
3 In the following, a firm index is omitted where no information is lost.
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δ. Standard calculations reveal that the profits from Nash-Cournot competition, col-
lusion, and defection are πN = (a − c)2/9, πA = (a − c)2/8, and πD = 9(a − c)2/64,
respectively. Hence, without investments, the critical lower bound of the discount
factors consistent with collusion is δ = 9/17. If firms are at least as patient, and
thus, δ ≥ δ holds, they can tacitly agree to set any quota between the competitive
and the joint-profit-maximizing level. However, choosing the smallest quantity that
does not destabilize collusion yields the highest profit and is thus optimal for every
firm.
2.2 The Basic Model of the Production Process
The manufacturing of medium- and high-tech products requires sophisticated tech-
nical equipment and constant adoption of new production processes. Production
costs differ greatly depending on the quality of the machinery and the technology
embodied in this equipment. Therefore, by investing in the latest equipment and
reorganizing production to make the best use of novelties allows for a considerable
reduction of production costs. However, such capital goods depreciate fast: Firstly,
very sensitive measurement and production machinery is usually fragile and wears
off quickly. Secondly, such equipment is itself a high-tech product that is subject
to rapid technological progress. This fact is mirrored by the assumption that the
knowledge embodied in high-tech production equipment is outdated and worthless
after one period. Recurring investments are therefore necessary in order to keep the
manufacturing process efficient. If these are not made, costs remain at the high level
corresponding to production with “traditional” technology.
In order to keep our model simple, we consider a duopoly (n = 2) and model this
investment-quantity competition as infinite repetition of a two-stage basic game. In
the first stage of each period, firm i invests in order to reduce the initial unit cost c by
eB xi, i = 1, 2, B = C, J, P . This requires expenditures γ x
2
i /2 on the improvement
of the production process. The efficiency parameter eB describes the effectiveness of
cost reduction achieved by the different possibilities to organize production where
the index C indicates investment “competition”, index J a “joint” venture, and index
P joint “production”. If firms realize synergies by cooperation, as is often claimed,
the efficiency parameter eB is higher the closer firms coordinate their investment
decisions. The investments of all firms are observable by the rivals. This mirrors
the fact that usually firms monitor each others activities, and workers of rival firms
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meet each other and talk about their work. The function
C(xi) = c − eB xi, i = 1, 2
thus describes the unit costs of firm i achieved by investments in the production
process if there are no fixed costs of production.
In stage two, firms produce and market the good. In order to keep the number of
parameters small we use a normed demand function. The inverse demand for the
homogeneous good is given by
pi = (a − qi − qj), i 6= j.
Therefore, a firm realizes the individual profit net investment costs




, c < a.
If a firm competes in the product market, it maximizes its individual profit, but if it
participates in collusion, it maximizes the sum of both firms’ profits, considering in
both cases the decision on cooperation or non-cooperation in manufacturing in the
first stage which is discussed in the following subsections.4
2.3 Investment Competition
In this case, firms set their investments non-cooperatively in order to maximize their
individual profits. We call this investment competition and indicate it by index C .
Table 1 gives the individual quantities, investments, and per-period profits from
competition, collusion, and defection in the market stage that result if firms set
investments non-cooperatively in the first stage of each period. They are derived by
solving the respective stage games by backward induction.
When cheating a firm always sets the collusive investment in the production stage
and defects in the market stage. This is true because the alternative deviation profit
4 Note, that extended to differentiated products this model can also be applied to demand increasing
investments. Then, a+eB xi is the market size achieved by expenditures γ x
2
i /2. The assumption
that the effect of investment wears off after one period then describes the fact that consumers get
used to the change in the design, packaging, or recipe and demand declines again after a while.
Hence, regular changes amounting to “rebranding” are needed in order to keep demand high over
time.
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xDC = xAC πDC =
γ (a−c)2 (72γ−25 e2C)
2 (16γ−5 e2C)
2
that it gains by investing non-cooperatively,
πDC,alt. =
4γ (a − c)2 (8γ − 5 e2C)
2
(9γ − 8 e2C) (16γ − 5 e2C)
2 ,
is lower than πDC for γ > 161 e
2
C/136 which is true for stable equilibria.
5 By inserting
the profits from Table 1 in (1) we obtain
δ ≥ δC ≡
8 (9γ − 4 e2C)
2
γ (1224γ − 233 e2C) − 58 e4C
(2)
as condition for collusion if firms compete in investments. If firms value future
profits highly, corresponding to a discount factor at least as large as δC , the above
condition is fulfilled. With these findings we are able to state our first result.
Proposition 1: In the case of non-cooperative investments in the production pro-
cess, a firm takes part in a collusive agreement if it values future profits as least as
much as indicated by the critical discount factor δC defined in (2).
With help of the critical threshold δC, we are also able to derive the effect of in-
creased efficiency in process improvement on the inclination to collude. The partial
derivative of the critical value of the discount factor with respect to eC
∂ δC
∂ eC
= −304γ eC (9γ − 4 e
2
C) (405γ − 104 e2C )




is negative by the second order condition for competition. Therefore, collusion in the
product market is facilitated if firms efforts to reduce costs are more effective. The
5 The second order condition for Nash-Cournot competition (punishment), is fulfilled if γ > 8 e2C/9,










< 1 (e.g. Martin, 2002, 30/1). In the present case, this is fulfilled








< 1 is true for
tacit collusion. A value of the investment cost parameter γ, γ > 4 e2C/3 fulfills the strictest of
these conditions. Hence, we restrict attention to such cases.
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reason for this effect is the negative externality of own cost reduction on the rival’s
profits. Since, the profit from defection appears in the denominator and numerator
of the critical discount factor (2), the effect is driven by the changes of the profits











5γ (a − c)2 (25 − 48γ)
(5 − 16γ)3
> 0,
can be determined. The competitive profit πNC falls with increasing efficiency be-
cause greater effectiveness of the rival’s cost reduction lowers a firm’s own profit
strongly and requires high expenditures on the improvement of its own production
process. The lower competitive profit implies a higher potential punishment of a
defector. Moreover, the collusive profit πAC rises with greater efficiency eC due to
the internalization of the negative strategic effect that requires a smaller effective
cost reduction eC xi, which is achieved by a lower investment. Both effects of a rise
in efficiency of the process improvement increase a firm’s inclination to participate
in an implicit quota agreement.
2.4 Joint Venture
If firms cooperate in improving the production process, they specify their obliga-
tions in a formal contract. Such a joint venture is covered by a block exemption or
can be registered at the competition authorities and is then legal. We model such
cooperation in a joint venture by assuming that the participating firms choose the
level of investment that maximizes joint profits. The corresponding values of invest-
ments, quantities and profits are indicated by index J . As process improvements are
firm-specific, the rival’s efforts do not directly lower a firm’s production costs despite
coordination of investments. However, as argued in the introduction increased effi-
ciency is often cited as the main motive to participate in joint ventures and is most
likely obtained by organizational and technological learning from each other. In our
model, such efficiency gains can be captured by assuming that the effectiveness of
cost reducing activities is higher if firms participate in a joint venture than in the
case of non-cooperative investment, eJ > eC.
In order to maximize their profits, firms that participate in collusion specify the
corresponding joint-profit maximizing investment level in the joint venture contract.
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Since a violator of the contract on cooperation in production is liable to pay damages
and a contractual penalty, a firm that deviates from an illegal quota agreement in
the market continues to set this joint-profit-maximizing investment.6 The equilibria
in the cases of deviation, collusion, and punishment given in Table 2 below are again
derived by solving the corresponding basic games by backward induction.7
































xDJ = xAJ πDJ =
γ (a−c)2 (9γ−2 e2J)
4 (4γ−e2J )
2
The per-period profits given in Table 2 determine a firm’s incentive to participate in
an implicit agreement. In order to determine the lowest value of the discount factor
that is consistent with perfect collusion we insert these profits in the condition for
collusion (1) and obtain
δ ≥ δJ ≡
9γ − 2 e2J
17γ − 4 e2J
. (3)
This proves our next Proposition.
Proposition 2: Firms that cooperate in a joint venture participate in collusion if
they value future profits highly implying a discount factor that is at least as high as
the threshold δJ given by (3).
6 πDJ,alt. =
4 γ (a−c)2 (2 γ−e2J)
2
(4 γ−e2J)
2 (9 γ−8 e2J)
is the profit a defecting firm obtains if it deviates already in the
investment stage. Comparison of this alternative profit with the deviation profit gained from
an investment at the collusive level πDJ given in Table 2 shows that the latter is higher for
γ > 26 e2J/17 and hence for all stable equilibria. As in the case of investment competition, a
defection in the investment stage does not occur even if the investment level are not contractible.
7 γ > 10 e2J/9 and γ > 3 e
2










< 1 the conditions for local stability of the equilibria in the case of non-cooperative
and collusive quantity setting, respectively. In order to ensure stability, we assume γ > 2 e2J to
hold. Salant , Shaffer (1998) analyze R&D investments in a model that is technically very similar
to the one presented here. They show that in the case of cooperative investments profits are
maximized by asymmetric R&D expenditures for certain parameter configurations. However, for
our linear, normed demand function and perfect appropriability, this is true only for values γ < 2
(eJ = 1 in their setting) that are not consistent with stable equilibria.
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According to business representatives, an increase in efficiency is the most important
reason for cooperation in manufacturing. Thus, it is interesting to determine how
efficiency gains, described by a rise in the parameter eJ , influence a firm’s inclination






(17γ − 4 e2J )
2
is positive. Therefore, collusion is less likely the higher the effectiveness of cost




4γ eJ (a − c)2





γ eJ (a − c)2
(e2J − 4γ)
2 > 0
show that both the profit from competition and collusion increase with rising effi-
ciency eJ . Here, firms internalize the negative externality either only by coopera-
tion in production or additionally by implicit coordination in the market. However,
the increases of competitive and collusive profits have counteracting effects on the







γ2 eJ (a − c)2 (4 e2J − 17γ)




demonstrates that the competitive profit increases less than the collusive profit.
Hence, cooperation in a joint venture makes illegal anti-competitive agreements less
likely if it raises firms’ effectiveness in improving the production process.
2.5 Joint Production
In other cases, cooperation includes production in a single plant. We term this type
of cooperation joint production and denote it by index P . Such close cooperation
implies that firms jointly choose the level of cost reduction eP X = eP (xi + xj) and
share the total investment costs γ/2X2 equally.
As firms produce in a jointly owned plant, they cannot reduce the investment in
process improvement without the partner noticing this and taking the case to court.
Therefore, in the case of defection or punishment, the firms continue to invest the
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previously agreed collusive investment levels if they participate in an implicit agree-
ment. Defection and punishment is hence restricted to the market stage. All equi-
librium values for this type of close cooperation in manufacturing are summarized
in Table 3 below. The equilibria are again obtained by solving the corresponding
stage games by backward induction.8






























γ (a−c)2 (9 γ−4 e2P )
16(2γ−e2P )
2
A firm’s inclination to participate in an implicit agreement depends on the relative
sizes of the per-period profits given in Table 3. By inserting these profits in condition
(1), we obtain
δ ≥ δP ≡
9γ − 4 e2P
17γ − 8 e2P
. (4)
as the condition for collusion. Therefore, the following Proposition is true.
Proposition 3: If firms that cooperate by joint production value future profits
highly, i.e. if the discount factor is at least as high as the critical value δP defined
by (4), they participate in collusion.





(17γ − 8 e2P )
2
is positive. If firms are more effective in cost reductions, they have to place a higher







γ2 eP (a − c)2 (8 e2P − 17γ)




8 The second order condition for the punishment is given by γ > 4 e2P /9, and for the collusive
equilibrium by γ > e2P /2. As firms choose the investment XP jointly, local stability of the
equilibria is not an issue here.
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is positive by the second order condition for collusion. If firms’ effectiveness in cost
reductions rises, the increase in the collusive profit does not outweigh the greater
reduction of the potential punishment. Thus, the reason for the lower inclination to
collude is the same as in the case of a joint venture.
3 Feasibility of Collusion
As in the case without investment in an improvement of the production process, the
feasibility of collusion depends on the value that firms place on future profits. The
lowest values, i.e. discount factors, that are consistent with collusion are drawn in
Figure 1. Note, that the second order conditions require γ > 8 e2C/9 ' 0.89 e2C in
the case of investment competition, γ > 10 e2J/9 ' 1.1 e2J in the case of joint venture,
and γ > e2P/2 in the case of joint production. These conditions are represented by
the dashed vertical lines in Figure 1.











δC , eC = 1
δJ , eJ = 1
δC , eC = 1.5
δJ , eJ = 1.5




The lower the threshold of the discount factor the larger is the scope for collusion.
Thus, a comparison of the critical values of the discount factor for joint production
δP , for production in a joint venture δJ , and for investment competition δC deter-
mines the ranking of the three types of production organization with respect to the
feasibility of collusion. It demonstrates that firms gain the widest room for collusion
if they do not cooperate in the investment stage. This finding stands in sharp con-
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trast to experts’ warnings in the discussions on the legal treatment of cooperation
in manufacturing.
Technically, straightforward comparisons of analytical expressions for the thresholds
δP in (4), δJ in (3), and δC in (2) lead to the following conclusions. The inequal-
ity δP > δJ holds for all values of the investment cost parameter γ that fulfill the
respective second order conditions if the effectiveness of cost reductions is the same
in a joint venture and with joint production, eP = eJ . Comparison of the deriva-
tives from Propositions 2 and 3 shows that the critical threshold δP rises stronger
in the efficiency parameter eP than δJ in eJ . Therefore, the inequality δP > δJ
is all the more true, if firms gain effectiveness in process improvement by closer
cooperation in the production stage, eP > eJ . Furthermore, δJ > δC holds for













are equally effective in both cases, eC = eJ = e. The first range of γ is excluded, but
the last inequality holds by the the second order condition γ > 3 e2C/8 or γ > 3 e
2
J/8.
Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrate that the critical value of the discount factor δC
falls, but δJ rises in the efficiency of cost reductions. Again, the conclusion δJ > δC
is strengthened if cooperation in a joint venture implies an efficiency gain, eJ > eC.
Figure 1 illustrates this results that are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4: Collusion is most difficult in the case of joint production, less
difficult in the case of a joint venture, and least difficult if firms compete in the
investments, i.e. δP > δJ > δC holds.
The critical threshold of the discount factor for collusion is lowest in the case of
investment competition. Figure 2 illustrates the development of the corresponding
per-period profits, adjusted by division by (a− c)2, in dependence of the investment
cost parameter γ. The thin lines show the profits obtained without investments,
the thick lines those gained from investment competition when eC = 1. Without
cooperation, the profit from non-cooperative investments in the production stage is
lower than without such cost-reducing process improvement. This illustrates that
cost reduction is a “tough” strategy in the terminology introduced by Fudenberg,
Tirole (1984) if firms compete in strategic substitutes (as is the case with quantity
competition when the good is homogeneous, c.f. Bulow et al. 1985). In this prisoners’
dilemma firms compete more aggressively and gain lower profits than in a market
without investments in cost reduction. Profits from collusion and defection in the
market stage, however, are increased by efforts to reduce unit costs compared to
profits gained without investments. When colluding, firms indirectly internalize the
15
Figure 2: Per-Period Profits with Investment Competition and without Investments















negative effect of own cost reduction on the rival’s profit by joint profit maximization
in the market stage. This effect together with the lower competitive profit, i.e. higher
punishment, overcompensates the increased one-shot gain from defection so that
collusion is more stable than without investments in cost reduction. As argued in the
discussion of Proposition 1, this “tough” strategic effect also determines the changes
of per-period profits caused by efficiency gains. Therefore, the effects of investments
are even more pronounced the higher the efficiency in process improvement.
Perhaps surprisingly, firms’ inclination to collude is lower than without investments
in production if they cooperate in a joint venture. Figure 3 demonstrates that such
cooperative investments in unit-cost reduction increase the profit from defection
more than the collusive profit which in turn rises stronger than the profit from
punishment compared to the respective profits gained without process improvement.
Analytically,
(πDJ − πD) − (πAJ − πA) =
(a − c)2 e2J (8γ − e2J)
64 (4γ − e2J)
2 > 0 for γ > e
2
J/8 and
(πAJ − πA) − (πNJ − πN ) =
e2J (a − c)2 (17γ − 2 e2J )
72 (4γ − e2J) (9γ − 2 e2J )
> 0 for γ > 2 e2J/17.
Thus, both differences of profits are positive by the second order condition for col-
lusion. This holds for all degrees of efficiency of cost reducing activities eJ . For the
sake of concreteness, Figure 3 shows the per-period profits for an effectiveness in cost
reduction of eJ = 1. As participants in a joint venture internalize the negative effect
of unit-cost reductions, cheating on a competitor that trustfully sets the collusive
output quota is all the more profitable. Moreover, the profit from competition in
the market stage is also higher implying a lower punishment. The collusive profit
does not offset this incentive to defect from the agreement. Therefore, collusion is
16
Figure 3: Per-Period Profits with a Joint Venture and without Investments
















less stable than in a market where firms cannot reduce production costs. In the
case of joint production the incentive to collude is even lower than in a joint venture
due to the additional increase of profits that results from the saving of investment
costs implied by production in a single plant. As in the case of a joint venture, the
competitive profit and the defection profit rise stronger than the collusive profit.
The graphic of these profits and the corresponding profits without investments in
cost reduction is qualitatively identical to Figure 3 and is thus omitted.
Note also, that the above effects of cost-reducing investments with different types of
organizing production are most pronounced for low costs of process improvement,
corresponding to a low value of the parameter γ. If conditions for investment in
production are unfavorable, however, these are small and the critical thresholds of
the discount factors converge against the critical value δ = 9/17 relevant in a market
where unit costs cannot be reduced by investing.
4 Profitability of Cooperation in Manufacturing
The ranking of profits gained by investment competition, cooperation in a joint
venture, and joint production is also a result of different extents of the strategic
effect of cost-reducing investments in the production process. If firms compete in
the production stage, these investments impose a negative externality on the rival’s
profit. If firms cooperate in a joint venture or by joint production they internalize this
negative effect. Moreover, the individual profit gained by joint production is higher
than in a joint venture because investments have to be made in only one plant.
If a firm takes part in an implicit agreement in the market stage it also accounts
17
for the negative effect of a larger production on rival’s profit. Therefore, collusive
profits are higher than competitive profits given the organization of production. In
short, the per-period profit is larger, the more intense cooperation in the investment
decision. Furthermore, it is higher if firms also implicitly coordinate their output
decisions in the market stage.9 Figure 4 shows the per-period profits for a situation
where the organization of manufacturing does not influence firms’ effectiveness in
cost reduction and eC = eJ = eP = 1.
Figure 4: Per-Period Profits from Collusion and Quantity Competition















Analytically, these conclusions are confirmed by comparisons of the per-period prof-
its given in Tables 1, 2, and 3. They lead to the following inequalities:
πAP > πAJ , for eP > eJ/
√
2 (if eP = eJ , ∀ γ),
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for(if eJ = eC , for γ > e
2/4,
πNP > πNJ for eP > eJ/
√
2 if eP = eJ , ∀ γ) and










(if eJ = eC, for γ > 2/9e
2).
These inequalities hold by the respective second order conditions.






16γ − 5 e2C
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]
/ [64γ − 25 eC ]
}
/4 and




9 Firms anticipate whether the value of future profits is sufficiently high to allow for collusion and
compete in the market otherwise. Therefore, defection does not occur in equilibrium. Hence, the
profits from defection are not discussed here and are also omitted in the Figure 4.
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complete the comparison. Proposition 5 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 5: πAP > πAJ > πAO > πNP > πNJ > πNC, holds for values of




2 (16γ − 5 e2C)
2
]
/ [64γ − 25 eC ]
}
/4. In
other words, this profit ranking results except if the conditions for investments in
process improvement are extremely favorable.
Thus, even the lowest collusive profit πAC is higher than the highest competitive
profit πNP except if the investment costs are low due to a value of γ. Since in the
case of joint production firms need only invest in a single plant, investment costs
implied by a certain level of unit costs are lower than in all other cases. If the
costs of process improvement are low, due to a small value of the parameter γ, this
cost saving outweighs the the profit increase associated with collusion. As a result,
the profit from joint production is higher than from investment competition even if
firms compete in the first and collude in the second case. In all other situations,
the ranking of profits is independent of technological conditions mirrored by the
parameter γ.
5 Welfare
From the perspective of policy agencies, the social welfare is the most appropriate
benchmark for a comparison of the results with different degrees of cooperation in
the investment decision and different product market strategies, i.e. collusion or
competition.
Welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and the sum of the firms’ profits.
If both firms produce in separate plants this amounts to
W (Q) = (a −Q/2) Q − [c − eB x] Q − γ x2, B = C, J (5)
where Q is the total quantity produced in the market. If production takes place in
a jointly owned plant welfare is given by




Inserting the equilibrium quantities and investments in these equations yields the
social welfare achieved by the three types of organizing production given in Table 4.
If production takes place in two plants, investment is required in both of them in
order to reduce unit costs, but if the total quantity is produced in one plant there
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is also only one production process that has to be optimized. Investment costs are
lower and welfare is higher in this case. Thus, a social planner maximizes the welfare
level (6) and sets X∗ = [(a − c) eP ] / [γ − e2P ] and Q∗ = [γ (a − c)] / [γ − e2P ] as the
optimal investment and quantity. In the first best case, the social welfare level is
W ∗ =
γ (a − c)2
2 (γ − e2P )
. (7)
In the benchmark case without investment, social welfare amounts to
Table 4: Welfare with Different Organization of Manufacturing
Punishment Collusion




γ (a−c)2 (96 γ−25 e2C)
(16γ−5 e2C)
2
Joint Venture WNJ =






Joint Production WNP =
4γ (a−c)2 (9 γ−2 e2P )
(9 γ−4 e2P )
2 WAP =
γ (a−c)2 (3γ−e2P )
2 (2γ−e2P )
2
WN = 4/9 (a − c)2 , (8)
WA = 3/8 (a − c)2 , (9)
in the case of competition and collusion between the firms, respectively.10 If unit-
cost-reducing investments are prohibitively expensive, firms’ investment levels con-
verge to zero and the above levels of welfare result, irrespective of whether firms are
patient enough to collude or not.
10 As one would expect, the welfare levels are higher the higher firms’ efficiency in cost reduction.
In order to see this, consider the partial derivatives
(∂ WNC ) / (∂ eC) = 32 γ eC (a − c)2 /
(
9 γ − 4 e2C
)2
> 0.
The sign of the following derivatives follows from the respective second order conditions.
(∂WAC ) / (∂eC ) = 10 γ eC (a − c)2
(




16 γ − 5 eC2
)3
> 0
(∂WNJ ) / (∂eJ ) = 8 γ eJ (a − c)2
(




9 γ − 2 eJ2
)3
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(∂WNP ) / (∂eP ) = 16 γ eP (a − c)2
(




9 γ − 4 e2P
)3
> 0
(∂WAP ) / (∂eP ) = γ eP (a − c)2
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Figure 5: Welfare with Different Organization of Manufacturing




















Figure 5 shows the different welfare levels for the case without additional efficiency
gains from collaboration, eC = eJ = eP = e = 1. Comparison of the welfare
achieved with investment in the reduction of unit costs shows that no extent of
coordination in production leads to the maximal welfare that would result from
investments and quantities chosen by a social planner. The second best in terms
of welfare is joint production with competition in the market. This follows from
the avoidance of “duplicative” investments. Whereas with both a joint venture and
investment competition both firms have to spend the same amount in order to achieve
a certain level of unit cost, in the case of joint production they invest in a single plant
and share the resulting expenses. Thus, they reach the same level of production
costs by much lower investments. This saving makes joint production superior to
the other two types of organizing manufacturing given competition or collusion in
the product market. In the other two cases, the firms produce in separate plants.
Hence, both competitors have to optimize their production process. Out of the two
cases with separate production, investment competition should be chosen by a policy
maker, since here, firms do not internalize the negative effect of own cost reduction
on rivals’ profits. Hence, investments and quantities are higher, the market price
is lower, and a higher welfare than in the case of joint venture formation results.
Moreover, given the organization of production, collusion implies a lower welfare
than competition. As a firm that takes part in an implicit agreement accounts for
the fact that a reduction of own production increases the rival’s profit, it invests
less and additionally reduces output in order to achieve a higher market price. This
in turn hurts consumers and reduces welfare. Only in the case of low investment
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costs (a low value of γ) is joint production superior to all other cases (except of
course joint production with competition in the market) even if the firms collude.
Proposition 6 summarizes these findings.
Proposition 6: The welfare ranking of joint production, investment competition,
and joint venture formation results given either unrestrained quantity competition or
an implicit quota agreement. Given the organization of production, welfare is lower
in the case of collusion than in the case of competition in the product market, except
if the investment costs are low, i.e. γ is very small.
The results for equal efficiency are obtained by straightforward comparison of the
welfare levels given in Table 4. The ranking for differences in the efficiency param-
eters are obtained analogously. The proof is hence omitted.
6 Conclusion
Experts warned that collaboration in manufacturing might facilitate anticompeti-
tive agreements in the product market. Our analysis disproves these conjectures.
Compared to non-cooperation in production, collusive agreements are less likely in
the case of cooperation in a joint venture or by joint production.
If firms do not cooperate in production, they reduce their unit costs by investing
in the production process and compete more aggressively in the product market.
If firms form a joint venture and coordinate their cost-reducing investments, they
internalize this negative effect on rivals’ profits and invest less. In consequence, the
competitive profit rises strongly relative to the profit gained from participation in
collusion. The potential punishment for defection from an implicit agreement and
hence firms incentive to participate in collusion is thus lower in the case of coordina-
tion of the investment decisions in a joint venture compared to non-cooperation in
production. Moreover, collusion is even less likely if firms produce in a single jointly
owned plant. In this case, they share the investment in cost reduction. The compet-
itive profit is therefore even higher and consequently the potential punishment lower
than in the case of a joint venture. These results are strengthened if cooperation
gives rise to efficiency gains in the cost-reducing activities.
Moreover, our model demonstrates that cooperation by joint production also yields
the highest welfare level if firms compete in the product market and is second best
only compared to the social-planner solution. Comparison of non-cooperation in
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production and joint venture formation shows that in the latter case firms reduce unit
costs less and produce less in order to mitigate the negative effect of cost reduction
and high production on the rival’s profit. Therefore, welfare is lower in the case of
a joint venture than in the case of non-cooperation in manufacturing. The welfare
ranking of joint production, investment competition, and joint venture formation
applies given collusion or competition in the product market. The exploitation of
market power by colluding firms implies that the welfare is lower if firms participate
in an implicit agreement than if they compete in quantities given the decision on the
organization of production. An exception to this is the case of joint production that
is superior to the other market outcomes even in the case of collusion if investment
costs are very low.
Hence, contrary to the intuition, joint production is a very attractive form of cooper-
ation in manufacturing as it yields the highest welfare level given either competition
or collusion in the product market. Above all, in this case it is most difficult for the
firms to collude in the market. If competitors are not willing to cooperate closely in
joint production, for example for fear of leakage of proprietary knowledge concern-
ing research, marketing and other business areas, policy makers have to weigh the
increased probability of collusion in the product market against the higher welfare
level that results from investment competition in comparison to a joint venture. As
investment competition yields a higher welfare level than a joint venture if firms com-
pete in the market, encouraging the formation of a joint venture is only advisable
if implicit collusion is a severe threat. In short, contrary to conventional wisdom,
relatively lenient antitrust regulation of cooperation in manufacturing is appropriate
especially if firms have a high inclination to collude in the product market.
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